Neglected no longer: Indians on Gallipoli

By Peter Stanley

The Gallipoli campaign is familiar to virtually anyone who has any interest in the Great War. Most people know something of the campaign’s optimistic intent, the disastrous landings in April 1915, the dogged Ottoman defence, the dramatic failure of the evacuation and the surprisingly successful evacuations late in1915 and in January 1916. In Britain, Australia and New Zealand they surely know of episodes in the campaign – the heroic slaughter at Lancashire Landing, the story of ‘Simpson’s donkey’, or the tragic failure of the New Zealanders who in August glimpsed the Dardanelles from Chunuk Bair. Thousands of books have been published on the campaign – the book catalogue alone of the National Library of Australia includes no fewer than 800 books with ‘Gallipoli’ in their titles. In Australia and New Zealand, of course, Gallipoli is so important that 25 April became a national day of remembrance.

Looking down from Gurkha Bluff, which the 1/6th Gurkhas seized in a daring attack in May 1915.

For India the Gallipoli story is very different. While a handful of regimental histories appeared between 1930 and 1948 in which their service on Gallipoli appeared as a chapter, not a single book dealt with the Indian experience of Gallipoli between 1915 and 2015. Until my book Die in Battle, Do not Despair: the Indians on Gallipoli, 1915 was published by Helion, we did not even know how many Indian troops served in the campaign. (Until research for Die in Battle… it was confidently asserted – including by me – that about 5,000 Indians served – in fact the figure was about 16,000: it took a century to establish that.)

The view of the Dardanelles glimpsed briefly by the 1/6th Gurkhas on the morning of 9 August 1915, as seen by Peter Stanley in conducting fieldwork on Gallipoli in 2014.

As an Australian military historian I had often written about Gallipoli. In the course of a career mostly spent either at the Australian War Memorial (Australia’s national military museum, where I had been Principal Historian) and latterly as an academic at UNSW Canberra, I had published half-a-dozen books dealing with Gallipoli – notably Quinn’s Post, Anzac, Gallipoli (2005), the first ‘biography’ of a place on Gallipoli. Having long been interested in the Indian Army, I knew that Indian troops had served there: one of my earliest articles had been on the Indian mountain gunners who had served with the Anzacs. I had planned a book on the subject, notionally called ‘Sahibs and Sepoys on Gallipoli’, long deferred until in 2013 I became Research Professor at UNSW Canberra and was at last able to implement my plan.

Peter Stanley’s laptop, when he was writing the last pages of Die in Battle… on Gallipoli in July 2014. 

The difficulties of researching Indians on Gallipoli partly explained why a book on the subject had taken so long. Military history tends to reflect national agendas (my Quinn’s Post was unusual in spanning the ‘Anzac’ experiences of Gallipoli) and few non-Indians seemed interested in India’s Great War. (Actually, few Indians seemed interested in India’s pre-1947 military history, but that is another story …) But the sources for this book needed to be sought in Britain, India, Turkey, Australia and New Zealand. The official records, including the war diaries, were held in the National Archives in Britain, and the Gurkha Museum in Winchester and the National Army Museum in London held vital sources. The National Archives of India held other official records, while the Gurkha Museum in Pokhara, Nepal, was also useful – and it was necessary to visit both Nepal and the Punjab, to see the regions where most ‘Indian’ troops originated. (While the mountain artillery, the supply and transport troops and one of the infantry battalions were Sikhs or Muslims from the Punjab, four ‘Indian’ infantry battalions on Gallipoli were Gurkhas.)

Balbir Singh Banwait, the son of a Sikh who served on Gallipoli, introduced himself to Peter Stanley in a Gurudwara in Sydney, providing invaluable family stories for Die in Battle…

Almost no sources had been created by Indian other ranks (though their British officers had written prolifically); a problem common to those trying to understand the non-European experience of war. But as an Australian historian, I knew that valuable insights into the Indian experience of Gallipoli could be found in the letters, diaries, memoirs and photographs of the Australian and New Zealand citizen soldiers who had served alongside them, and the archives and libraries in both countries provided crucial evidence.

Finally, having written about battles (and indeed published a guide to battlefield research – A Stout Pair of Boots, 2008) I knew that another visit to Gallipoli was necessary. In August 2014 I was able to spend several days re-visiting Gully Ravine, Mule Gully, Hill 971 and Hill 60, checking the sources and what I’d made of them against the ground. No wonder it had taken so long to be able to tell this story!

Peter Stanley greeted by senior staff of the Gurkha Museum in Pokhara, Nepal, while researching Die in Battle… in Janary 2014.

Now Helion is re-issuing Die in Battle, Do Not Despair as a paperback. I was already delighted that in 2017 an Indian edition appeared in association with Primus Books of New Delhi, and now the paperback will, I hope, bring the story of Indians on Gallipoli to yet more readers, wherever they may be.

Prof. Peter Stanley of UNSW Canberra has published 40 books, mostly in military history. Three of them have been published by Helion: A Welch Calypso (ed., with Tom Stevens, 2014); Die in Battle, Do Not Despair and ‘Terriers’ in India: British Territorials 1914-19 (2019) He is now working on John Company’s Armies: the Military History of British India 1824-57

The Secret Expedition. The Anglo-Russian Invasion of Holland 1799

By Geert van Uythoven

North Holland, 10 September 1799:

At daybreak the English spotted our advance guard, setting fire to the windmill in front of St. Maarten and opening fire on us with their batteries. On this spot, where the dragoon detachment had to remain in place, we were greeted by the fire of a howitzer of the enemy, which killed four of our horses. A dragoon’s cartridge-box was ignited and this set his uniform on fire. Only his presence of mind saved him, jumping quickly into a ditch filled with water, and the fire was extinguished. In the meanwhile the 1st Lieutenant Hoevenaar ordered his dragoons to close up, at which moment the detachment was hit by a 12-pdr cannon ball, which wounded a horse badly: the horse lost his complete forehead between the eyes and the nose, and it was necessary to shoot the animal. After this had taken place, two guns from the horse artillery arrived, commanded by Captain d’Anguerand. He deployed in front of the dragoons, and the accompanying caisson was placed at the same spot the dragoons were. The dragoons had no other option as to deploy in a new position, left of the road, close to the caisson and a small house, because there was not enough room to deploy properly.

After a short while a shell from a howitzer fell amidst of the horse-team of the caisson and three of the horses were killed instantly. Because we were so close near this caisson, it was lucky that the exploding shell did not hit the caisson itself, because when this would have happened surely the whole dragoon detachment and everyone near it would have been killed. It is commonly known that the terrain, where we fight on in Holland, has narrow roads and is intersected by many ditches and canals, which makes fighting very difficult.

Thus, Lieutenant Hoevenaar of the Batavian Dragoon Regiment describes his participation in the attack on the English positions in the Zijpe on 10 September 1799. His account illustrates that, contrary to the British and Orangist beliefs, the Batavian army was willing to fight for their country and did not run or defect at the first sight of the British. At a certain moment, the British Lieutenant General Abercromby even doubted the outcome of the battle and prepared for re-embarkation. Yet the common British expectation of an easy and victorious campaign was not surprising: years of polarisation between the Patriots and Orangists had divided the Dutch to the bone, not unlike the Democrats and Republicans in today’s USA. These divisions were also the main reason that the French were able to overrun the Dutch Republic easily in 1795, creating the French puppet state called the Batavian Republic. Hearing about the allegedly growing resentment of the Dutch against their French oppressors, a rising en masse of the Dutch population was to be expected.

The campaign had started well enough for the British: although their beach landing was opposed and fiercely contested, the swift capture of Den Helder provided a safe port. The subsequent capture of the Batavian fleet at the Vlieter, without a shot being fired, strengthened their belief that the Batavian Republic was ripe for capture and the reinstatement of the House of Orange. With the British army reinforced by a substantial contingent of the formidable Russian army, the capture of Amsterdam would be a matter of time. As so often, the situation under the surface proved to be much more complex and challenging.

In writing The Secret Expedition I tried to provide the reader with a thorough insight in all this. Treating all nations and armies participating, sketching the political situation and the events leading up to this remarkable campaign, where British and Russians joined forces in an effort to turn the tide against the French rule of a large part of Europe, I studied the battles that were fought, which are described in detail, leading often to a fresh insight contrary to those of previous historians, who often copied supposed facts without challenging them. The text further includes many quotes and accounts to provide the reader with a ‘look and feel’ of how the participants experienced the events during these memorable months, in a campaign during which the reputation of many participants was built or came to an abrupt end.

The new paperback edition of Geert van Uythoven’s The Secret Expedition: The Anglo-Russian Invasion of Holland 1799 is available to order from the Helion website: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/the-secret-expedition-the-anglo-russian-invasion-of-holland-1799.php

Defeat of a British outpost near Schoorldam
Zijpe polder seen from the Westfriesche Zeedijk between Eenigenburg and St Maarten
Zijpe Sluices

Into the Iron Triangle

By Arrigo Velicogna

‘One side could move quickly, could almost disappear at will, controlled large areas of the countryside. The other side had overwhelming firepower but were always going to be “strangers in a strange land”.’[i]

These two sentences encapsulated our common understanding of the Vietnam War. They are simple, effective, but hopelessly misleading. Yet they are entrenched deep not only in the common understanding, but also in plenty of academic analyses. But a repeated lie is still a lie, despite its popularity. Wars in Vietnam, either the French ‘Indochina War’ or the American ‘Vietnam War’, are misunderstood, misremembered and misrepresented. Few years ago historian Dale Andrade wrote that the understanding the US Army had of the Vietnam war came ‘in spite of its own official history, which provides a balanced and detailed account of the war.’[ii]

The war the United States, the Republic of Vietnam and their allies faced in Vietnam was at the same time a conventional war and an insurgency. Diminishing the former to emphasise the latter, has had been recently fashionable is wrong. In writing Into the Iron Triangle I wanted to provide the readers with a counter to the constant rehashing of myths and stereotypes. The book looks at one year of clashes between Saigon and the Cambodian border culminating in the first multidivisional American operation of the war, ATTLEBORO.  These clashes chiefly involved the US 1st Infantry Division, the famed Big Red One, and the Peoples Armed Forces 9th Division. Battles alone were just a single component of a complex war so I have put them into their strategic context, showing large clashes were an integral part of both sides’ strategy. Beside chronicling the battles, Into the Iron Triangle looks at the units involved, their organisation, their doctrine and their equipment. The reader will discover how both sides were in reality strangers in a strange land, and were constantly trying to bring overwhelming firepower on their opponent.  

Hopefully I have brought a convincing alternative to our common understanding and one that brings to the fore what was really happening on the ground rather than generic theories of conflict.

Into the Iron Triangle is now available to buy on the Helion & Company Ltd website here: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/into-the-iron-triangle-operation-attleboro-and-the-battles-north-of-saigon-1966.php


[i] Eoghan Kelly, Nam the Way it Was, Wargames Soldier and Strategy, 113, 2021, p.78

[ii] Dale Andrade, Westmoreland was Right, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 19-2, 2008, p.149

The Anglo-Spanish War 1655-1660

By Paul Sutton

The Anglo-Spanish War 1655-1660, the subject of a two-volume set written by me and to be published by Helion and Company this year, dramatically altered the balance of power in Europe. The upstart English Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell, buoyed by its victory in the First Dutch War and egged on by France, had the temerity to challenge the might of the King Philip IV’s Spanish Empire at its economic heart in the Americas. The result propelled England onto the world stage, making it a colonial power and a diplomatic and military force to be reckoned with, whilst at the same time humiliating the Spaniards and accelerating the decline of its international power and prestige, which further encouraged the expansionist King Louis XIV to challenge Spanish domination in Europe. These two books examine both the causes and consequences of this war, whilst also explaining in detail the fighting that occurred across the Caribbean during this five-year period.

Portrait of Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England c. 1653-1664
(Jan van de Velde (after Robert Walker), The Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, RP-P-1890-A-16095)

The war highlighted the inherent weakness of the Spanish empire at the time. Despite ample warning of an English attack Spanish diplomacy was unable to halt it. In the West Indies it had no navy to protect its vast possessions and so the English fleet was able to roam at will. Despite a defeat in Hispaniola the English occupied Jamaica and for five years the Spanish could do little to resist the occupation; what few forces it could muster from its nearby colonies were poorly equipped and even poorer led and were quickly defeated. Despite rumours to the contrary the Spanish lacked the resources to dispatch a relief force from Europe as it was engaged in a prolonged struggle with France, which the English soon joined in. Spain had claimed the Americas for itself and denied entry to all other nations but was powerless to stop even this poorly equipped English encroachment. The last Jamaican-based Spanish forces were harried off the island in 1660 but even after this humiliation they lacked the capacity to defend themselves elsewhere. The English sack of Santiago de Cuba in 1662 was but the forerunner of the pirate attacks of Henry Morgan in the years to follow and to which the Spanish were to offer no resistance. The ultimate indignity came at the Treaty of Madrid in 1670 when Spain formally ceded English possessions in the West Indies and the myth that the Americas were perpetually Spanish was shattered. These events, coupled with defeats against France, spelt the end of Spanish dominance in Europe and so the known world. But…as one power fell, so another arose.

Portrait of Philip IV, King of Spain c.1615-1657
(Jacob Louys, The Metropolitan Museum, New York, 51.501.7557)

Cromwell’s attack was the English state’s first attempt at colonial expansion. With this state enterprise came the responsibility to pay for and maintain the colony, a responsibility that proved initially to be too overwhelming for the London government. However, in time the bureaucrats learnt to administer far away colonies and established specific government apparatus to enable this and that ultimately provided the mechanism to control a global British empire. The subsequent administration of faraway colonies made it imperative that an adequate state navy was available, but it was also one that could be equally used for defence and expansion and so there is a clear line between the occupation of Jamaica and the development of a truly global state naval capacity. Over the coming decades the English developed a Caribbean empire with Jamaica at its hub, built upon privateers, sugar and slaves, which generated enormous wealth for the mother-country, and which help propel its colonial, diplomatic, and commercial ambitions upon a truly world stage. Despite the shambolic nature of the English campaign Cromwell was clearly perceived in Europe to have humbled Spain, an act that immensely increased English prestige in the continent’s capital cities. England became almost instantly a major power and influencer on the continent at the expense of Spain, but this would also lead to friction with France that would simmer for decades to come and often explode into open conflict.

It might have taken a century or more after the humbling of Spain before England gained dominance over the French and later the world but the roots of this were established because of Cromwell’s war in the West Indies. The Lord Protector’s intrepid scheme to steal South America from Spain might not have been fully (or even partially) realised but his desire to place England at the forefront of world power politics was and later generations expanded on this dream. Cromwell would surely have approved of what followed. The Anglo-Spanish War truly shifted the balance of power in Europe and contributed to both the rise of Britain and France and the demise of Spain.

The Siege of Fort Augustus

By Jonathan Oates

275 years ago on this day, 5 March 1746, Major Hugh Wentworth, deputy governor of Fort Augustus (built 1729-1742, at the south-western end of Loch Ness), surrendered his fort to the Jacobite besiegers. Guided by artilleryman Major James Grant, the Jacobites made the best use of their few small calibre guns; or maybe they were plain lucky: ‘For while the walls were being bombarded by the artillery, a shot fell into the powder magazine. The powder ignited, and large pieces of masonry being blown up, a breach was made in the fort on this side’.

The fort’s Master Gunner later stated that the Jacobite guns blew up the powder barrels and cartridges on the turret of Wade’s Bastion. There had also been a shell on the court room and damage to the roof on the north side. No one had been injured, though, and the well was undamaged.

Fort Augustus (Map by George Anderson © Helion and Company)

Was Wentworth right in surrendering? His Master Gunner thought not. He argued ‘That the major and the other officers of the Garrison were mistaken in their assertion when they say there was no place of safety for the men to retire to or to boil their pots, for it appears that besides the vaults their common barracks were proof against any shells the rebels had to throw into the fort’. He concluded that it was ‘ignorance and panick that seized them all’.

How long they could have continued such resistance is a moot point. Cumberland did not think it was a strong point and the Board of Enquiry into the fort’s surrender later found, after studying the plans of the fort and having read statements from witnesses, ‘that the fort was defenceless. But do think that they ought to have delayed capitulating until the batteries had been playing upon them’.

Coehorn Mortar, as used in many of the sieges during 1745 and 1746 (Collection at Kedleston Hall, Photo by Brian Stone)

The result of that surrender was that part of the Jacobite army, including Grant and his guns, would go on to besiege Fort William, which was rather more strongly defended and guided by a more resolute defender. Not only did Fort William hold out, in a siege that lasted from 20 March to 3 April 1746, but the Jacobites were then decisively defeated at Culloden on 16 April. The capture of Fort Augustus, as things turned out, was the last major Jacobite military success.

Dr Jonathan Oates tells the story of this and the surprisingly large number of other sieges that took place in Scotland and England during 1745 and 1746, in his book The Sieges of the ’45: Siege Warfare during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746, which is available from the Helion and Company website: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/the-sieges-of-the-45-siege-warfare-during-the-jacobite-rebellion-of-1745-1746.php

You may read it in the ruins of this place…

By Richard Israel

In my first book for Helion Cannon Played from the Great Fort’ Sieges in the Severn Valley during the English Civil War 1642-1646, I have examined the towns of Bristol, Gloucester, Worcester, Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury. All of these towns had medieval walls, albeit in a variety of conditions.

However, the focus of this short article is Taunton in Somerset.  Unlike any of our case studies, it began the war with no earthworks surrounding it.[1] Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper noted that any defences were “but pales and hedges and no line about the town”.[2] The town does have a stone castle, of which construction was commenced around 1107 AD by William Gifford[3] near the bank of the River Tone.

Taunton experienced three sieges during the Civil War. The first siege began September 1644 and was a Royalist plan to retake the town from Parliament. After two failed attempts to storm the town, the Royalists tried to blockade the town with a perimeter of one to two miles (1.60-3.21 kilometres), and established garrisons at Chideock, Cokum, Wellington and Wycraft houses. They were unsuccessful.[4] The siege ended on 15 December 1644.[5]  

On 11 April 1645, Goring under directions from Prince Rupert sent the artillery and foot of Sir Joseph Wagstaff towards Taunton; whilst the horse went east to watch for any Parliamentary reinforcements approaching.[6]

Having around 4,200 foot and 2,000 horse, the Royalists began to increase their attacks. However, the town defences had been improved–illustrating how quickly preparations were made. The first defensive line consisted of two forts; whilst a second line inside the town was of fortified houses, barricades and entrenchments. The Royalists attack had three approach lines, which were covered by artillery. A night assault at 07:00 p.m. on 8 May 1645, captured the two forts.[7]

Inside the defenders’ line, houses were on fire. On 9 May 1645, the town was attacked at 11:00 a.m. By 06:00 p.m., the castle, church and Muyden’s Fort were still held by the besieged; although 20 houses were burnt by grenades and mortar fire. The town did not have enough fodder for horses and people were starving.[8]

A relief force, containing some 6,000 men, under the command of Weldon approached the town and drove off the Royalists.[9] After 94-days, the siege had left 150 garrison soldiers dead, another 200 hundred wounded, two-thirds of the houses destroyed and people starving. Bed cords were used as matches for musketeers, and to keep the horses alive, thatch from the roofs had been taken down to feed them.[10]

The third siege was a brief affair. By July, Fairfax was able to manoeuvre the New Model Army into Somerset, and face the Royalists under the command of Goring at the Battle of Langport on 10 July 1645.[11]

Evidence of the Civil War can be seen in the archaeological record in the form of defensive ditches, with one on Canon Street measuring 1.5m in depth and 5m in width. A siegework with banks of earth 3m in height near the north-east side of the castle has also been examined.[12] Further research, including the role of the castle in the war, is necessary.

“You may read it in the ruins of this place…her heaps of rubbish, her consumed houses, a multitude of which are raked in their own ashes. Here a poor forsaken chimney, and there a little fragment of a wall that have escaped to tell what barbarous and monstrous wretches there have been”.[13]

The words of the Minister of Taunton, George Newton in 1646 illustrates that the town of Taunton was a microcosm of the Civil War. The evidence of despair, destruction–the effects of siege warfare is clearly seen in the historical and archaeological records.  

Preliminary research for my second book for Helion, involving an examination of the castles during the Civil War is underway. Like ‘Cannon Played from the Great Fort’ Sieges in the Severn Valley during the English Civil War 1642-1646 it will involve an examination of the geology, topography, cartographic, historical and archaeological evidence available.

A copy of ‘Cannon Played from the Great Fort’ Sieges in the Severn Valley during the English Civil War 1642-1646 can be purchased here.

Bibliography

Gathercole, Clare, Somerset Extensive Urban Survey – Taunton Archaeological Assessment (Taunton: Somerset County Council, 2002).

Morris, Robert, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645 (Bristol: Stuart Press, 1995).

Prior, Stuart, A few well–positioned castles: The Norman Art of War (Stroud: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2006)

Underdown, David Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum (Newton Abbot: David & Charles (Holdings Ltd, 1973).

Turton, Alan, Civil War in Wessex (Salisbury: Wessex Books, 2015).

Wroughton, John, An Unhappy Civil War: The Experiences of Ordinary People in Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1642-1646 (Bath: The Lansdown Press, 1999).


[1] Robert Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645 (Bristol: Stuart Press, 1995), pp.5-6.

[2] David Underdown, Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum (Newton Abbot: David & Charles (Holdings Ltd, 1973), p.80.

[3] Stuart Prior, A few well–positioned castles: The Norman Art of War (Stroud: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2006), p.71.

[4] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, p.6.

[5] Alan Turton, Civil War in Wessex (Salisbury: Wessex Books, 2015), p.22.

[6] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, p.7.

[7] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, p.7.

[8] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, pp.7-8.

[9] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, p.8.

[10] John Wroughton, An Unhappy Civil War: The Experiences of Ordinary People in Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1642-1646 (Bath: The Lansdown Press, 1999), p.227.

[11] Morris, The Sieges of Taunton 1644-1645, p.11.

[12] Clare Gathercole, Somerset Extensive Urban Survey – Taunton Archaeological Assessment (Taunton: Somerset County Council, 2002), p.28.

[13] Wroughton, An Unhappy Civil War, p.195.

A WWII Picture Mystery – SOLVED!

By Mike Glaeser

At least here in the United States, the internet and its usage to spread misinformation and conspiracy theories has become a topic of heated debate. Every now and then, however, the internet can also bring people together and provide some positive magic. Last month I wrote a blog post about several photographs from WWII in my family’s collection. The goal was to try and identify a Royal Navy captain and thus find a burial of British servicemen. Thanks to some kind suggestions and the assistance of an internet forum community and researchers at a former POW camp, the identity of the captain was confirmed within 24 hours and the entire story pieced together within 48! It was a tremendous group effort and the individuals involved will be thanked at the end of this post.

***

The burial of RAF airmen at Bevern Cemetery, Germany in 1941- accompanied by POWs from Stalag XB Sandbostel and a Luftwaffe Guard of Honor led by Leutnant Ernst Bauer.

The following narrative is an account of the events and personnel depicted in the attached photographs.

On the night of 22 June, 1941, Hampden bombers from 83 Squadron took off from their airfield at Scampton, Lincolnshire. They were to form part of a raiding force of 45 Wellington and 25 Hampden bombers targeting German infrastructure at Bremen. Hampden AD969, code DL-X, was flown by Pilot Officer Richard John Heavens and Sergeant Walter George Price, and also include Flight Sergeant Neil Erskine Byres and Flight Sergeant Eric William Sponder. The aircraft was coned by searchlights while flying low and was shot down near the village of Bevern in the district of Bremervörde, Germany. Official documentation of the flight in the National Archives lists the crash as having occurred on 23 June. All four airmen were killed.

On the day of the burial, POWs from the nearby Stalag XB Sandbostel were brought in to take part in the ceremony. The highest-ranking officer of the internment camp was Royal Navy Captain Graham Francis Winstanley Wilson (saluting, holding wreath). He was captured after his armed boarding vessel, HMS Vandyck, was sunk by dive bombers off the coast of Andenes, Norway on the last day of the allied campaign in Norway- 10 June, 1940. In the photograph of him saluting the fallen airmen, he is accompanied by Major White of the Green Howards. He was captured while serving with his unit in France, 1940 and became the camp padre (chaplain). The German priest on the left of the image is a civilian and most likely from the congregation in nearby Bremervörde.

The airmen were accorded full military honors. Leutnant Ernst Richard Bauer led a Luftwaffe guard of honor at the burial. He was serving as a Gruppenleiter at the Munitions Depot in neighboring Hesedorf.

The burial itself took place in the village cemetery of Bevern despite there being two camp cemeteries further south (Lagerfriedhof Parnewinkel and Sandbostel). Given the crash date, the funeral must have taken place near the end of June or early July. After the war, the airmen were reburied at Becklingen on 3 October, 1946. Their graves are marked in Plot 13, Row F, Graves 1-4.

***

I am currently working to identify the servicemen’s next of kin so they can be given the full story and copies of the additional images from my personal collection. Thankfully, all four of the servicemen were transferred to the Becklingen War Cemetery in 1946 and their exact resting places are known. While the story unfortunately revolves around the deaths of four men, we can rest assured knowing that honor was satisfied and this little sub-plot of WWII has the happiest of endings, given the circumstances.

My utmost thanks to the following:

  • Herr Schneider in Grosenbrode
  • Herr Sperling in Sandbostel
  • Mr Singleton of Helion & Co
  • Mr King for his National Archives recommendation
  • Mr Russell, author of Theirs the Strife, for his recommendation of the WW2Talk forum
  • And a very special thanks to the following users of the WW2Talk forum (www.ww2talk.com):
  • CL1, Tony56, Alex1975uk, timuk, Itdan, Tricky Dicky, travers1940, JimHerriot, Tullybrone, JDKR, DaveB, Harry Ree, Wobbler, Lindele.

Well done all.

Scharnhorst: The Formative Years 1755-1801

By Charles White

Chuck White talks about the writing of his recent book, Scharnhorst: The Formative Years 1755-1801, for our From Reason to Revolution 1721-1815 series.

If you are a student of German military prowess, then you need to read my book. Although much ink has been spilled on the subject of German military history over the past three centuries, with campaign and battle studies, memoirs, biographies, uniform plates and guides, orders of battle, wargames, and much more, far too much time and energy has been sadly devoted to the 12 years of the Nazi period. No other period of German history has been dissected more. For many, it would seem, Germany has only twelve years of history, from 1933 to 1945. Scharnhorst: The Formative Years, 1755-1801, is an attempt to rectify this sorry state of affairs. 

The origins of my book began during my junior year at West Point (1972-73). During the spring semester I took my first elective (we were given only six), which was a history course entitled, ‘War and Society’, taught by the academy’s first visiting professor – Jay Luvaas, a leading American scholar of military history. The research paper topic I drew literally from a hat was ‘The Impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Prussia’. All of the topics were overly broad for a 25-page paper, which gave us cadets some latitude in narrowing our focus on a subject to our liking, with the parameters of our topic. After conducting my preliminary research (and encouraged by Professor Luvaas), I settled on Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813), the great reformer of the Prussian military establishment following her catastrophic defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806.

The title of my paper, ‘Scharnhorst: Father of the Modern Army’, reflected my belief that the modernization program Scharnhorst implemented, though vastly unfinished by his own admission, over time became the model of large professional organizations – first in Prussia, then in Germany, and later (in varying degrees) in every major army in the world. Realizing the severe constraints under which he labored, Scharnhorst wrote to his favorite student and close personal associate, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), on 27 November 1807, advising him:

Who would not risk everything to plant the seed of a new tree, who would not gladly die if he could hope that the fruit would ripen with new strength and vitality! But only one thing can make that possible. We must kindle a sense of independence in the nation; we must enable the nation to understand itself and take up its own affairs; only then will the nation acquire self-respect and compel the respect of others. To work toward that goal is all we can do. To destroy the old forms, remove the ties of prejudice, guide and nurture our revival without inhibiting its free growth – our work cannot go further than that.

Scharnhorst and his associates clearly understood how to proceed in a potentially hostile environment. They planted a new tree, which over time produced the fruits of victory some 50 years later during the Wars of German Unification (1864-71).

After graduating from West Point, I continued my research and study into German military prowess, wondering why the German army continued to captivate so many American soldiers, despite the fact that it was the American army that had defeated the German army in two world wars. Interestingly, whenever I had opportunity to speak with German senior officers (I was stationed in Germany in the 1970s) about their military prowess, they would politely smile and refer me to Scharnhorst and the German notion of Bildung. Interestingly, Scharnhorst regarded the process of Bildung as central to the professional growth of the military leader. A fruit of Germany’s classical age, Bildung was the perfectibility of the individual’s character and intellect through the process of education and training. For Scharnhorst, Bildung was the mental fitness that empowered the military leader. It enabled him to assimilate knowledge from a variety of sources and then to synthesize and fashion that data into an appropriate response to the challenge at hand. It was a recurrent process rather than mere training to accomplish a certain skill.

Chuck White with General der Panzertruppe Hasso von Manteuffel in June 1977 at his home in Bavaria. Chuck spent the day with him, discussing his experiences as a tank leader. At that time Chuck was a First Lieutenant with the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Bad Kissingen, Germany.

Scharnhorst and Bildung became the central theme of my studies at Duke University, from 1980-86. My Masters’ Thesis focused on Scharnhorst’s efforts to establish a professional military educational program in Prussia. I then spent two wonderful years in Berlin on a Fulbright Fellowship, during which time I researched the holdings of the Prussian Archives, which housed Scharnhorst’s Papers (Nachlaβ Scharnhorst) and other primary and secondary sources. Returning to Duke, I wrote my dissertation on Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-05. Both studies covered Scharnhorst’s endeavors to inculcate Bildung into the Prussian army. Three years later I published my first book, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805 (1989). That study focused primarily on Scharnhorst’s pivotal role as the intellectual father and educator of the Prussian army, whose amazing recovery following its catastrophic defeat in 1806 remains one of the most remarkable feats in military history.

Following the publication of The Enlightened Soldier, I embarked on the research and writing of this book. So much is known about Scharnhorst and his activities in Prussian service. So little is known or has been written about his formative years in Hanover, where he carefully crafted and endeavored to implement the modernization program he later realized in part in Prussia. This point is significant. When Scharnhorst arrived in Berlin in 1801, he already had his master plan in mind and continually looked for ways to bring the Prussian army and its leadership in step with the transformation of war shaped by the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

This study of Scharnhorst presents unpublished discoveries about his youth, his education, and his extensive time in Hanoverian service. Scholarship in the field of German history during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries has increased dramatically over the past 30 years; the most significant for this study was the publication of Scharnhorst’s Papers [Nachlaβ Scharnhorst] in eight massive volumes, with over 3,000 documents. These papers formed the foundation upon which I built my story of this enlightened soldier. I used primarily the first two volumes that deal with his long career in Hanover. Selected documents from other volumes are also included.

With the Internet came access to so many key sources that I might not otherwise have been able to obtain and research. Nearly all the rare books and journals I had studied in Germany in the early 1980s are now available on the worldwide web, especially the irreplaceable journals of the University of Bielefeld digital collection. Through the Internet I was also able to connect with other scholars who led me to addition resources and websites.

Returning to my introductory remarks, Scharnhorst: The Formative Years, 1755-1801, is the starting point for those seeking to understand German military prowess. In was in Hanover that Scharnhorst developed the ideals and institutions that made the Prussian and later German armies the model upon which nearly every other major and minor power in the world fashioned its military establishment.

Scharnhorst: The Formative Years 1755-1801 can be ordered from the Helion website: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/scharnhorst-the-formative-years-1755-1801.php

The Armed Forces of North Korea

By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

When the Cold War ended, and the Iron Curtain was lifted, an era commenced of which the unprecedented spread of information is perhaps its most defining characteristic. The proliferation of media (primarily through the advent of the global internet), increased transparency of nations across the world, and what amounts to the commercialisation of the arms trade have all caused a wealth of knowledge to become accessible even to those with limited resources. This has caused the area of open-source intelligence (OSINT) to bloom like never before, with a vast variety of high quality works on pretty much every imaginable topic suddenly becoming available.

Of course, exceptions remained. Some regions were left stuck in a vacuum from which information seeped only slowly due to tight security, poor connectivity or mere neglectfulness. Nevertheless – or perhaps precisely because of this reason – it is often these regions that play a pivotal role in today’s conflict areas. Perhaps the most fragrant such case is the one we have chosen to address in On the Path of Songun. As quite unambiguously the most militarised nation in existence today, the topic of North Korea’s armed forces for a long time resembled an ocean of inaccessible knowledge, surrounded by the impenetrable dyke* that is the DPRK’s (mostly) self-imposed isolation and pathological secrecy.

But then, this dyke sprung a leak. In fact, a major rent has since appeared, aiding the aspiring OSINT analyst and allowing him to begin navigating the unknown waters that make up the obscure area of North Korean military matters. The two most important developments that contributed to this change include the increasing availability of commercial satellite imagery, and the fact that North Koreans have eagerly taken advantage of the internet themselves to spread propaganda videos glorifying the leadership and their armed forces. Combining these two sources of information and cross-checking them with more conventional written publications and, of course, copious amounts of our own research, has provided an effective way of essentially rewriting the book on the DPRK’s armed forces and its equipment.

Roughly five years ago, we were not entirely aware of the fact that this was what we were about to set out to do. We were even less aware of the fact that it would take until now to definitively put this thing together. As it happened, two factors would ultimately conspire to keep us one step away from the finish line at all times:
Factor 1: The North Koreans are surprisingly busy bees when it comes to military innovation.
Factor 2: The authors of this book are surprisingly bad at deciding when it is time to stop including new material.

The first factor was exacerbated by Kim Jong Un’s renewed dedication to the creation of a credible strategic deterrent for his nation, in the form of his oft-promoted Byungjin Line. The confrontational attitudes between the DPRK, ROK and the USA during the period of writing ever seemed to further egg on the North’s military machine, at times leaving the intelligence community scrambling to keep up with the latest developments. In the end, the (now failed) period of diplomatic rapprochement in 2018/2019 and the implicit cessation of military posturing finally allowed us to catch up, in spite of factor 2, and put a conclusion to what has become an unintentionally complete accounting of all matters related to North Korea’s armed forces, from the Korean War until now.

The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun can be ordered here.

* Forgive the awkward analogy – both of us are after all Dutch by birth.  

The Army of George II

Peter Brown talks about the writing of his recent book for our From Reason to Revolution 1721-1815 series.

If you’re a fan of the British Army of the eighteenth century then you may feel that you don’t need to read this book. After all, much ink has been spilled on the subject over the years, with uniform guides and accounts of the battles and campaigns easily available. Believe me, I was acutely aware of how much was already in print when I sat down to write it.

However, almost all of the work currently available on the army of George II provides the reader with a snapshot of army life. There are many books on the French Indian War, for example, the Jacobite ’45, or the campaign in Germany during the Seven Years War. What appeared to me to be lacking was a view of the army ‘in the round’, so to speak; looking at every aspect of it from the accession of George II in 1727 to around the time of his death in 1760. How did it develop? How was it recruited, trained and disciplined? What were the officers like and how did they learn their trade? What about the medical services, the system of command and control and the changes to all of this that had to be made on campaign? We all know that the army marched to battle, but how exactly was this achieved and who was responsible if it all went wrong?

Fusilier, 23rd Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers), War of the Austrian Succession (Reconstruction by Richard Marren Craft Workshop – photograph © Alan ‘Kael’ Ball)

Filling all of these gaps in our knowledge became the aim of the book and it often took me down some very unglamorous roads. I had to begin with the accounts, looking at how the army was funded and who exactly held the purse strings. Readers with a love of military history often do not share a love of eighteenth-century accounting, but none the less, the detail of how the army was funded is necessary if one is to understand why it was always short staffed, under equipped and often much too small to carry out the tasks allocated to it. I also had to explore the often-overlooked topic of logistics, which any military man will tell you can make or break a campaign. The housing, supply and movement of the army from A to B was no easy task and this book explores the intricacies of the system alongside its obvious failings.

The organisation and uniforms of the infantry, cavalry and artillery are dealt with in depth, with a chapter on each arm that tracks the development of their uniform and structure as the century wore on. Details are also provided of their colours, officer distinctions, and the role of the various officers in battle.  The medical facilities available to the army, both on campaign and at home, is not a topic well covered outside academic circles and I wanted to cover this, especially in regard to the aftermath of battle and the treatment wounded soldiers could expect. I was certainly surprised by the key role the soldier’s wives played in this, alongside the general support that they provided not only to the men, but to the regiment they were attached to.  Indeed, they were, in many ways, an invisible and often unrecognised logistical arm. The final chapter looks at how the men and their families mustered out, sometimes with a pension but more often simply laid off when the war ended and left to fend for themselves.

15th Light Dragoons, 1760 (Original artwork by Patrice Courcelle, © Helion & Company)

Writing this book was not all hard slog. From the chapter on recruitment, through the court martial system and on to the officers and their ‘duels of honour’, I found much to smile about. The British squaddie, it would appear, has not changed over the centuries and if there was trouble to get into he was sure to find it. There are some great little stories that I was keen to retain as they show off the indomitable spirit of the British soldier whilst showing the reader that army life was not all floggings and drill.

Going back to my opening paragraph, my aim throughout this project was to fill that hole in your knowledge that previous books on the subject had failed to do. Hopefully by the end of it you should have a complete understanding of the eighteenth-century British Army. It was a joy to research and write and I do hope you enjoy it.

You can order The Army of George II from our website: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/the-army-of-george-ii-1727-1760-the-soldiers-who-forged-an-empire.php